Art & Atrocity: Cultural Depravity Justifies Cultural Deprivation by Guggenheim, Jack Achiezer
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 8 Volume VIII 
Number 3 Volume VIII Book 3 Article 1 
1998 
Art & Atrocity: Cultural Depravity Justifies Cultural Deprivation 
Jack Achiezer Guggenheim 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Jack Achiezer Guggenheim, Art & Atrocity: Cultural Depravity Justifies Cultural Deprivation, 8 Fordham 
Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 699 (1998). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol8/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 








Art & Atrocity:  Cultural Depravity 
Justifies Cultural Deprivation 
Jack Achiezer Guggenheim* 
INTRODUCTION 
At the end of World War II, in the wake of the horror and dev-
astation of the Nazi war effort, the Soviet Union captured a signifi-
cant collection of art from Nazi Germany.1  Some of those pieces 
of art came from the private and public collections that had been 
stolen by the Nazis,2 but many of the works came from legitimate 
 
* Associate, Sidley & Austin, Washington, D.C.  Yeshiva University, B.A., cum 
laude, 1993; Columbia Law School, J.D. 1996; Parker School of International and Com-
parative Law, C.O.A. 1996.  The opinions expressed in this Essay are the author’s own 
and are not attributed to Sidley & Austin or its clients.  This Essay is dedicated to my 
family, particularly my mother, and it is in memory of the relatives, whom I never knew, 
who perished in the Holocaust and who taught me that the lessons of the Holocaust must 
never be forgotten. 
1. See Alan Riding, Museums and the Spoils of War:  Are Finders Keepers?, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 1995, at E3. 
2. Immediately after the fall of the Third Reich, Germany’s national collections 
were swollen with tens of thousands of art objects looted from conquered countries.  See 
WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH:  A HISTORY OF NAZI 
GERMANY 946-47 (Simon & Schuster/Touchstone 1990) (1959) [hereinafter RISE AND 
FALL OF THE THIRD REICH] (detailing the Nazi looting of art treasures from conquered 
nations, primarily from France, where the Germans stole enough art work in 1940 to fill 
“134 [railroad] freight cars loaded with 4,174 cases of art works comprising 21,903 ob-
jects, including 10,890 paintings . . . includ[ing] works of, among others, Rembrandt, 
Rubens, Hals, Vermeer, Velázquez, Murillo, Goya, Vecchio, Watteau, Fragonard, Rey-
nolds and Gainsborough”).  In a secret order issued in 1940, German Reichsmarschall 
Hermann Goering specified three categories of disposition for the art objects then being 
plundered from the Louvre Museum in Paris: 
1.   Those art objects about which the Fuehrer has reserved for himself the deci-
sion as to their use. 
2.   Those . . . which serve the completion of the Reich Marshal’s collection . . . 
3.   Those . . . that are suited to be sent to German museums. 
Goering Order of November 5, 1940, Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, Hitler’s 
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German national collections, museums, and institutions.3  For more 
than half a century the Soviet Union denied that it had these works 
of art in its possession.4  Recently, however, Russia, the successor 
to the Soviet Union, admitted to taking these works; Russia also 
prominently displayed them in its museums.5  Germany has de-
manded the return of the art, stating that the works of art are Ger-
many’s cultural property and that under international law and trea-
ties, Russia is required to return them.6  Germany’s claim 
 
Headquarters, at 53 (Aug. 16, 1942), quoted in RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH, su-
pra, at 945 & n.16; see also Angela Joy Davis, Comment, Beyond Repatriation:  A Pro-
posal for the Equitable Restitution of Cultural Property, 33 UCLA L. REV. 642 (1985) 
(discussing the legal responsibility to restore cultural property to the victims of the Holo-
caust).  See generally Lisa J. Borodkin, Note, The Economics of Antiquities Looting and a 
Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1995) (discussing a victim’s legal 
rights to the return of stolen art); Hans Kennon, Take a Picture, It May Last Longer if 
Guggenheim Becomes the Law of the Land:  The Repatriation of Fine Art, 8 ST. THOMAS 
L. REV. 373 (1996) (same). 
3. Hitler, a failed house painter, dreamed of building a “super-museum” of “non-
degenerate” art in Linz, Austria.  See Sylvia L. Depta, Comment, Twice Saved or Twice 
Stolen?  The Trophy Art Tug-of-War Between Russia and Germany, 10 TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 371, 371 (1996); see also ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF [MY STRUGGLE] 258-
66 (Ralph Manheim, trans., Houghton Mifflin Co. 1971) (1926) (delivering a tirade 
against the rise of degenerate and senseless modern art in Germany and Austria). 
4. See Riding, supra note 1. 
5. See id. 
6. See id.  Depending upon the country or international agreement, the definition of 
cultural property varies greatly.  A general definition includes art, artifacts, antiques, sig-
nificant architecture, artificial landscapes, religious objects and sites, and native peoples’ 
objects.  See Roger W. Mastalir, A Proposal for Protecting the “Cultural” and “Prop-
erty” Aspects of Cultural Property Under International Law, 16 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 
1033, 1040 (1993) (discussing accepted definition of cultural property); Elissa S. 
Myerowitz, Comment, Protecting Cultural Property During A Time of War:  Why Russia 
Should Return Nazi-Looted Art, 20 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1961, 1964-67 (1997).  The 1970 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) Conven-
tion on the Means of Prohibiting the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property is widely accepted as providing a workable definition of cultural prop-
erty.  UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Im-
port, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, art. 1, 823 
U.N.T.S. 231, 234-36, 10 I.L.M. 289, 289-90 [hereinafter UNESCO Convention].  The 
UNESCO Convention defines cultural property as: 
[P]roperty which, on religious or secular grounds, is specifically designated by 
each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehistory, history, litera-
ture, art or science and which belongs to the following categories: 
(a) rare collections and specimens of fauna, flora, minerals and anatomy, 
and objects of paleontological interest; 
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encompasses an estimated two hundred thousand museum quality 
pieces and two million books.7  The German government believes 
that among those objects are unique representations of German 
culture and history, such as two Gutenberg Bibles and eighty early 
German gold items.8  To date, Russia has refused to return the ap-
propriated art on the grounds that the art should serve as compen-
sation for the damage Germany inflicted on Russia during the Sec-
ond World War.9  Russia also asserts that it is not bound to return 
the German art under international law or treaties.10 
Current international law favors Russia’s position, but only on 
the timing of the claims, not on legal principle.  Although the 1995 
Convention of the International Institute for the Unification of Pri-
 
(b) property relating to history, including the history of science and tech-
nology and military and social history, to the life of national leaders, 
thinkers, scientists and artists and to events of national importance; 
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and clandes-
tine) or of archaeological discoveries; 
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological sites 
which have been dismembered; 
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as inscriptions, coins 
and engraved seals; 
(f) objects of ethnological interest; 
(g) property of artistic interest, such as: 
(i) pictures, paintings and drawings produced entirely by hand on any 
support and in any material (excluding industrial designs and manu-
factured articles decorated by hand); 
(ii) original works of statuary art and sculpture in any material; 
(iii) original engravings, prints and lithographs; 
(iv) original artistic assemblages and montages in any material; 
(h) rare manuscripts and icunabula, old books, documents and publications 
of special interest (historical, artistic, scientific, literary, etc.) singly or in 
collections; 
(i) postage, revenue and similar stamps, singly or in collections; 
(j) archives, including sound, photographic and cinematographic archives; 
(k) articles of furniture more than one hundred years old and old musical 
instruments. 
Id. at 234-36, 10 I.L.M. 289-90. 
7. See Riding, supra note 1. 
8. Rod MacLeish, The Art and the Glory:  The Lost Masterpieces of the Hermitage, 
VANITY FAIR, Mar. 1995, at 126, 138. 
9. See Catherine Foster, Stolen Art as War Booty:  Hostages or Harbingers of 
Peace?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Feb. 8, 1995, at A18. 
10. See Riding, supra note 1. 
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vate Law (“UNIDROIT Convention”)11 calls for the return of cul-
tural property, it is inapplicable to the current dispute between 
Germany and Russia because the UNIDROIT Convention does not 
apply retroactively. 
Although the UNIDROIT Convention should be used for guid-
ance in resolving disagreements over appropriated cultural prop-
erty,12 injustice would flow from application of the UNIDROIT 
Convention to the current Russian-German dispute.  The return of 
appropriated cultural property to those who have committed acts of 
inhumanity would help recreate the same mindset that led to the 
atrocities.  Moreover, cultural property should not be returned 
where the value of such return is outweighed by equitable con-
cerns.  Where a country has acted with cultural depravity, it justi-
fies its own cultural deprivation.  Where the cultural property was 
used in, or contributed to, popularly supported acts of inhumanity, 
civil forfeiture of property used in a crime is a means of helping 
reimburse society for the costs associated with such crime and 
fighting such crimes. 
This Essay argues that Russia’s refusal to return the German art 
is correct under a theory of cultural forfeiture.  Part I summarizes 
the facts leading up to the current dispute, presenting both Ger-
many’s argument for the return of the appropriated art and Russia’s 
justifications for retaining it.  Part II proposes the doctrine of cul-
tural forfeiture, which rests on the concept that cultural depravity 
justifies cultural deprivation, and sets forth a three-pronged test to 
determine when a country loses its right to demand the return of 
cultural property appropriated from its museums and other national 
 
11. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT):  Final 
Act of the Diplomatic Conference for the Adoption of the Draft Convention on the Inter-
national Return of Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, June 24, 1995, 34 I.L.M. 
1322 [hereinafter UNIDROIT Convention].  The International Institute for the Unifica-
tion of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”) is an intergovernmental organization, based in 
Rome, which attempts to harmonize the laws of different countries.  In 1988, UNIDROIT 
began drafting codes for the harmonization of cultural property laws. 
12. See generally Myerowitz, supra note 6 (arguing that using the UNIDROIT 
Convention as a guidepost Russia should return the World War II art to Germany).  But 
see generally Depta, supra note 3 (arguing that all the appropriated art, that of Germany 
and its victims, should be kept by Russia in order to avoid causing instability in the art 
and antiquities market). 
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institutions and archives.  Part III applies the cultural forfeiture test 
to the dispute between Russia and Germany and finds that the test 
is satisfied by the barbaric acts of inhumanity committed by the 
German people during World War II.  This Essay concludes that 
the cultural forfeiture test justifies Russia’s retention of German 
artwork appropriated from German national collections, institu-
tions, and museums at the end of the Second World War. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The modern-day tug of war over the appropriated German cul-
tural objects continues a dispute that is rooted in the lawlessness 
and Nazi terror of World War II, but is now fought on the higher 
plane of international law.13  Citing the UNIDROIT Convention,14 
which advocates that stolen cultural property must be returned to 
its true owner,15 Germany argues that whenever possible cultural 
property should be returned to its country of origin because cul-
tural property enhances a country’s quality of life, economy, and 
cultural environment by helping a nation define its identity and 
origin.16  The Russian government maintains that it is lawfully en-
titled to the cultural objects under the Act of State Doctrine as le-
gitimate reparations for the destruction of its own cultural property 
by Germany, and as the result of the doctrine of prescription.17 
A. Facts of Dispute 
In January 1995, the Russian government confirmed the rumor 
that it had confiscated German cultural objects at the end of the 
Second World War, partly as revenge and partly as restitution, for 
the destruction of Russian cultural property during the Nazi inva-
sion of Russia.18  In that same year, the Hermitage Museum in St. 
 
13. See Myerowitz, supra note 6, at 1990. 
14. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11. 
15. See id. art. 3, 34 I.L.M. at 1331. 
16. See John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 
AM. J. INT’L L. 831, 845-48 (1986); see also, Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics of Antiqui-
ties Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1995). 
17. See S. Shawn Stephens, The Hermitage and Pushkin Exhibits:  An Analysis of 
the Ownership Rights to Cultural Properties Removed from Occupied Germany, 18 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 59, 96-97 (1995). 
18. Near the end of the Second World War, the Soviet army established trophy bri-
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Petersburg opened an exhibition entitled “Hidden Treasures Re-
vealed”19 while the Pushkin Museum in Moscow showed a similar 
display entitled “Twice Saved.”20  The following year, the Pushkin 
Museum opened the “Gold of Troy” exhibition.21 
The cultural property on display came from many different 
sources including German museums, institutions, and personal col-
lections of works Germany had taken from its victims.22  Two no-
table collections that were taken from Jews and subsequently taken 
from Germany by Russia are the collections of the Herzog and Ha-
vatny families of Budapest.23  Those collections and other works 
stolen by Germany from its victims are distinct from, and should 
be treated differently than, the national collections Russia has 
taken from Germany.  In 1990, the German and Russian govern-
ments began negotiations regarding the possible return of the cul-
tural property.  But those discussions stalled, and Germany now 
demands that the Russian government return its national treas-
ures.24 
B. Relevant International Agreements 
The Hague Conventions of 189925 and 190726 established the 
 
gades, which were divisions of the Soviet army.  Their mission was to capture artwork 
from German museums and bunkers and return it to Russia.  See Myerowitz, supra note 
6, at 1990.  The trophy brigades would look throughout Germany for specific pieces of 
art with an equivalent value to an item of Russian art that was missing or destroyed.  See 
H. Wayne Elliott, Beautiful Loot, 153 MIL. L. REV. 275, 276-77 (1996) (reviewing 
KONSTANTIN AKINSHA & GRIGORII KOZLOV, BEAUTIFUL LOOT (1995)). 
19. See Richard Beeston, War Booty Row Over Russian Exhibition, THE TIMES 
(London), Mar. 30, 1995 (stating that the exhibition consisted of 74 paintings, including 
works by Picasso, Van Gogh, Renoir, and Cezanne). 
20. See Riding, supra note 1 (reporting that the exhibition included 63 works, most 
notably works by El Greco and Goya). 
21. See Christopher Knight, Displaying the Spoils of War, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 
1995, at A1 (previewing the 1996 opening of the exhibit, which would include “gold 
from ancient Troy, excavated and taken to Germany”). 
22. See Stephens, supra note 17, at 62-63. 
23. See Jo Ann Lewis, Uncovering a Buried Treasure, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1995, 
at B1. 
24. See Beeston, supra note 19; Knight, supra note 21. 
25. Convention with Certain Powers on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 
July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803 [hereinafter 1899 Land War Convention]. 
26. Convention with Other Powers on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 
GUGGENHEIM.TYP 9/29/2006  4:41 PM 
1998] ART & ATROCITY 705 
first formal international guidelines for the protection of cultural 
property during wartime.27  The 1954 Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
(“Hague Convention”) further attempted to protect cultural prop-
erty.28  The Hague Convention explicitly prohibits countries from 
damaging and stealing cultural property during a war.29 
In 1970, the Hague Convention was supplemented by the 
UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing 
the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property (“UNESCO Convention”).30  The UNESCO Convention 
requires any country exporting cultural property to provide ade-
quate ownership documentation with the exported object.31  It fur-
 
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter 1907 Land War Convention]. 
27. Russia was a party to both the 1899 and 1907 Land War Conventions.  The 
guidelines of those conventions include a general rule prohibiting the confiscation of pri-
vate property and a rule imposing legal proceedings on any destruction, damage, or con-
fiscation of private property.  See 1907 Land War Convention, arts. 46 & 56, 36 Stat. 
2306-07, 2309; see also, David A. Meyer, Note, The 1954 Hague Cultural Property Con-
vention and its Emergence Into Customary International Law, 11 B.U. INT’L L.J. 349 
(1993). 
28. See Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Protection of Cultural 
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter 
Hague Convention]. 
29. See Hague Convention, art. 4, 249 U.N.T.S. 242-44 (explaining the Hague Con-
vention’s general prohibition against destruction of cultural property).  The Hague Con-
vention prohibits any act of hostility against cultural property.  Included in this general 
prohibition are any acts of theft, pillaging, or vandalism of cultural property.  The Hague 
Convention states that: 
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated 
within their own territory as well as within the territory of other High Contract-
ing Parties by refraining from any use of the property and its immediate sur-
roundings or of the appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are 
likely to expose it to destruction or damage in the event of armed conflict; and 
by refraining from any act of hostility directed against such property. 
Id. at 242-44. 
It is noteworthy that Germany, which now seeks protection under international con-
ventions for its cultural property, ignored the French government’s World War II protest 
that the plunder of France’s art treasures in 1940 violated the Hague Convention.  See 
RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH, supra note 3, at 945 (quoting Reichsmarschall Goer-
ing’s reaction to the French protest as, “I am the highest jurist in the state, [hence i]t is 
my orders which are decisive”). 
30. See UNESCO Convention, supra note 6. 
31. See id., art. 6, 823 U.N.T.S. at 240, 10 I.L.M. 290-91.  Article 6 of the UNESCO 
Convention requires the introduction of an export certificate for any object, that the ob-
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ther provides that all signatory nations should enact legislation 
prohibiting domestic institutions32 from possessing any illegally 
obtained cultural property.33 
The 1995 UNIDROIT Convention is the most recent step for-
ward in the protection of cultural property.34  The UNIDROIT 
Convention is based on the common law philosophy that cultural 
property must be returned to its true owner.35  In order to appease 
civil law countries, the UNIDROIT Convention provides that any 
dispossessed owner of cultural property who was a bona fide pur-
chaser shall receive compensation for the return of the property to 
its original owner.36  Although there was much discussion during 
the Convention about the implications of retroactively applying the 
convention,37 it was ultimately determined that the agreement 
would be a purely active agreement that strongly condemned prior 
acts.38 
 
ject not be exported unless it has such a certificate, and that the restriction be publicized.  
Id. 
32. See id., art. 7(a), 823 U.N.T.S. 240, 10 I.L.M. 291 (mandating that signatory 
nations take necessary steps consistent with their national legislation). 
33. See id., art. 7(a), 823 U.N.T.S. 240, 10 I.L.M. 291. 
34. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, 34 I.L.M. passim; see also, 
Myerowitz, supra note 6, at 1977 (citing Lyndel V. Prott, UNESCO and UNIDROIT:  A 
Partnership Against Trafficking in Cultural Objects, 1 UNIFORM L. REV. 59 (1996)); 
Claudia Fox, Comment, The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen Property or Illegally Ex-
ported Cultural Objects:  An Answer to the World Problem of Illicit Trade in Cultural 
Property, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 225 (1993); Spencer A. Kinderman, Comment, 
The UNIDROIT Draft Convention on Cultural Objects:  An Examination of the Need for 
a Uniform Legal Framework for Controlling the Illicit Movement of Cultural Property, 7 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 457 (1993); Nina R. Lenzer, Comment, The Illicit International 
Trade in Cultural Property:  Does the UNIDROIT Convention Provide an Effective Rem-
edy for the Shortcomings of the UNESCO Convention?, 15 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 469 
(1994); Monique Olivier, Comment, The UNIDROIT Convention:  Attempting to Regu-
late the International Trade and Traffic of Cultural Property, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. 
REV. 627 (1996). 
35. See UNIDROIT Convention, supra note 11, art. 3, 34 I.L.M. 1331. 
36. See Myerowitz, supra note 6, at 1982. 
37. See INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW, 
DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE FOR THE ADOPTION OF THE DRAFT UNIDROIT CONVENTION ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL RETURN OF STOLEN OR ILLEGALLY EXPORTED CULTURAL OBJECTS, 
ACTS AND PROCEEDING 42 (1995) (discussing drafters’ reasoning behind adoption of final 
convention articles). 
38. See Myerowitz, supra note 6, at 1984. 
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C. Germany’s Position 
Germany’s argument for the return of its cultural art is founded 
on the concept of cultural nationalism.  Cultural nationalism is the 
belief that whenever possible cultural property should be returned 
to its country of origin,39 because it enhances a country’s quality of 
life, economy, and cultural environment.  The enhancement occurs 
because the property helps a nation define its identity and origin,40 
as well its sense of its present and future.41  Furthermore, the exis-
tence of a common culture is closely tied to the awareness of a 
sense of community, and protecting cultural property fosters a 
community’s awareness of common culture and helps people to 
remain aware of the way in which individuals in a community are 
intertwined.42  Arguably, cultural nationalism applies not only to 
art created in a certain country, but also to art that first became 
truly culturally valuable in such country.  In an agreement based on 
the principle of cultural nationalism, prior to the revelation that 
Russia had taken art from Germany at the end of the World War II, 
the Russian and German governments decided under the provisions 
of the 1990 German-Russian Cooperative Treaty43 that both coun-
tries would return any cultural objects illegally in their posses-
sion.44 
 
39. See John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80 
AM. J. INT’L L. 831, 845-48 (1986); see also, Lisa J. Borodkin, The Economics of Antiqui-
ties Looting and a Proposed Legal Alternative, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 377 (1995).  As a 
general rule, the taking of government property without the sovereign’s consent is illegal 
and is the equivalent of common law theft under customary international law.  Neverthe-
less, there has historically been an exception to this general rule for the taking of property 
from the vanquished nation by a conquering nation to prosecute a war effort.  See 
LEONARD D. DUBOFF, THE DESK BOOK OF ART LAW 129 (1977). 
40. See Stephanie O. Forbes, Comment, Securing the Future of Our Past:  Current 
Efforts to Protect Cultural Property, 9 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 235, 241-42 (1996); see also 
Robin Morris Collin, The Law and Stolen Art, Artifacts, and Antiquities, 36 HOW. L.J. 17 
(1993). 
41. See Paul M. Bator, An Essay on the International Trade in Art, 34 STAN. L. REV. 
275, 304 (1982); see also Kimberly A. Short, Note, Preventing the Theft and Illegal Ex-
port of Art in a Europe Without Borders, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 633 (1993). 
42. See Bator, supra note 41, at 304. 
43. Treaty on Good-Neighborliness, Partnership and Cooperation, Nov. 9, 1990, 
F.R.G.-U.S.S.R., art. 16, 30 I.L.M. 504, 512 [hereinafter German-Russian Cooperative 
Treaty] (stating intentions to return cultural property to its original owners). 
44. See Myerowitz, supra note 6, at 1991. 
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The argument has been made that the UNIDROIT Convention 
should be applied as a guide formulating a disposition to the cul-
tural property taken during the Second World War.  Under such an 
application, Germany’s cultural property taken by the Soviet Un-
ion at the end of World War II and presently in Russian museums, 
should be returned to the German government.45  It has been fur-
ther recommended that the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
should adjudicate this dispute and that the ICJ should take advan-
tage of the UNIDROIT Convention and apply it as a guide in its 
determination.46 
D. Russia’s Position 
The Russian government maintains that it lawfully obtained the 
cultural objects after World War II under the Act of State Doc-
trine,47 because the Russian government was, for all intents and 
purposes, the legal German government when it took the cultural 
objects.48  Russia also argues that as a victorious occupying power 
it is allowed legitimate reparations for the destruction of its own 
cultural property by Germany, the vanquished government.49  In 
addition, Russia argues that the passage of time has given it title to 
the artwork by way of the doctrine of prescription,50 as recognized 
 
45. See id. at 1964. 
46. See id. at 1996. 
47. See Knight, supra note 21. 
48. See id.  But see Menzel v. List, 267 N.Y.S.2d 804, 813-19 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (pro-
viding an example of a court’s reasoning as to why the Act of State Doctrine might not 
apply), modified as to damages, 279 N.Y.S.2d 608 (App. Div. 1967), rev’d as to dam-
ages, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979 (1969).  In Menzel, the court held that the plaintiff was the sole 
owner of a Chagall painting because, inter alia, the Nazi confiscation of the painting did 
not occur within the territorial limits of the German government.  Id. at 815-16.  But see 
Stroganoff-Scherbatoff v. Weldon, 420 F. Supp. 18, 22 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that the 
Act of State Doctrine applied because the Russian Army appropriated works pursuant to 
governmental decree as recognized by the United States).  In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. 
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), the Supreme Court stated that for the Act of State Doc-
trine to apply, a taking must be done by a sovereign government, within the territorial 
limitations of such government, by a government that is recognized at the time of suit. 
49. See Knight, supra note 21. 
50. With the passage of time, ownership rights vest in possessed property in order to 
promote stability.  See D.H.N. Johnson, Acquisitive Prescription in International Law, 27 
BRIT. Y.B. INT’L LAW 332, 333 (1950). 
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by both civil law and common law systems.51  Therefore, Russia 
maintains that it is not in violation of any international agreements.  
Russia also believes the 1990 German-Russian Cooperative Treaty, 
like the other international agreements cited by Germany, was not 
intended to apply retroactively, hence is not binding or determina-
tive in the current dispute.52  Russia additionally argues that the 
taking of the cultural property was lawful as a reprisal for Ger-
many’s initiation of the war and its intentional mass destruction of 
Russian art and architecture.53  As for the property that Russia ap-
propriated from Germany, which originally belonged to Germany’s 
victims, Russia, at least in principle, has agreed to return them to 
such victims or their survivors.54 
II. CULTURAL FORFEITURE 
As our society evolves from a series of national communities to 
a global community, it becomes necessary to adapt domestic ideas 
to the international arena.  One concept, heavily developed in the 
United States and experiencing a recent resurgence in popularity, is 
civil forfeiture.  That concept is premised on the belief that forfei-
ture of property used in a crime reimburses society for the expense 
of such crime and fighting such crimes.55  The concept of civil for-
feiture can be adapted to the current dispute between Russia and 
Germany over the cultural property that Russia appropriated from 
Germany at the end of the Second World War.  This new concept 
and device should be termed cultural forfeiture, as it dictates the 
circumstances under which a country forfeits its right to its cultural 
property. 
The historical antecedents of civil forfeiture can be traced to 
 
51. See Stephens, supra note 22, at 96-97. 
52. See Depta, supra note 3, at 384. 
53. See Stephens, supra note 22, at 61. 
54. See Knight, supra note 21. 
55. The director of the Executive Office for Asset Forfeiture, Cary Copeland, de-
scribed civil forfeiture as “an ancient legal procedure which is proving to be dramatically 
effective in attacking modern crime.”  Cary Copeland, CIVIL FORFEITURE FOR THE NON-
LAWYER 2 (BJA Asset Forfeiture Project, Wash., D.C., Spring 1992), quoted in William 
Carpenter, Reforming the Civil Drug Forfeiture Statutes:  Analysis and Recommenda-
tions, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1087, 1104 (1994) (discussing the forfeiture controversy, the 
problems with drug forfeiture statutes, and approaches to reform). 
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biblical times.56  Since then it has appeared in the legal systems of 
the Athenians, the Romans, and the Goths, among many other le-
gal systems.57  The English jurist William Blackstone explained 
that one rationale for the forfeiture of property is that forfeiture 
serves as a remedy for a breach of the social contract.58  Black-
stone’s comments may be transposed from the national context to 
the international context.  Just as an individual who violates the so-
cial compact with the state may be deprived of property, the coun-
try that violates the social compact of the international community 
may be deprived of property.59 
A. Application of Cultural Forfeiture 
The international community should adopt cultural forfeiture as 
a free standing device and incorporate it into the UNIDROIT Con-
vention and other relevant agreements as an exception to the inter-
national community’s determination that cultural property gener-
ally should be restored to the deprived nation.  The standard for 
 
56. See George T. Pappas, Comment, Civil Forfeiture and Drug Proceeds:  The 
Need to Balance Societal Interests With the Rights of Innocent Owners, 77 MARQ. L. 
REV. 856, 858-60 (1994); see also Jacob J. Finkelstein, The Goring Ox:  Some Historical 
Perspectives on Deadlands, Forfeitures, and the Western Notion of Sovereignty, 46 
TEMP. L. Q. 169, 180-81 (1973). 
57. See Carpenter, supra note 55, at 1103-05. 
58. William Blackstone wrote that: 
[A]ll property is derived from society, being one of those civil rights which are 
conferred upon individuals, in exchange for that degree of natural freedom 
which every man must sacrifice when he enters into social communities.  If 
therefore a member of any national community violates the fundamental con-
tract of his association, by transgressing the municipal law, he forfeits his right 
to such privileges as he claims by that contract; and the state may very justly 
resume that portion of property, or any part of it, which the laws have before 
assigned him. 
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *299; see also Pappas, supra note 56, at 860. 
59. See generally Michael F. Alessio, Comment, From Exodus to Embarrassment:  
Civil Forfeiture Under the Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 48 SMU L. REV. 429 
(1995) (discussing the history of civil forfeiture, its development in western jurispru-
dence, and its application and constitutionality in the United States); Donald J. 
Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Civil Forfeiture and the War on Drugs:  Lessons From 
Economics and History, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 79 (1996) (same); Alan Nicgorski, The 
Continuing Saga of Civil Forfeiture, the “War on Drugs,” and the Constitution:  
Determining the Constitutional Excessiveness of Civil Forfeitures, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 374 
(1996) (same). 
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cultural forfeiture should be premised on the idea that where a 
country has acted with cultural depravity, it has justified its own 
cultural deprivation.  The various agreements calling for the return 
of cultural property assume that the return of such property ad-
vances the development of the deprived country and that such re-
turn is also ultimately in the best interest of the rest of the interna-
tional community.60 
Those assumptions are not always valid.  Furthermore, other 
concerns may trump the best interests of the deprived country.  For 
example, it is very possible that the return of Germany’s cultural 
property is not in the best interest of Germany or the international 
community.  Such return could contribute to the re-establishment 
of the German mindset responsible for the Holocaust, hence equi-
table considerations urge that Germany be deprived of its art and 
that Russia have the right to keep it.  Thus, the best interests of 
Germany and the international community might be best served by 
Germany’s cultural deprivation being another form of punishment 
for that country’s inhuman actions of World War Two.  Therefore, 
it is necessary to establish a standard to determine when the return 
of cultural property is not in the overall best interest of the de-
prived country and the international community, or when such in-
terests are outweighed by other interests. 
1. Structure of the Cultural Forfeiture Test 
The return of cultural property is not in the overall best interest 
of a deprived country or the international community when the cul-
tural property was used in, or contributed to, popularly supported 
acts of inhumanity, due to the legitimate fear that return of appro-
priated cultural property would help recreate the same national 
mindset that underlay the original acts of inhumanity.  Further-
more, cultural property should not be returned where the value of 
such return is outweighed by equitable concerns. 
In order to reach these objectives, a cultural forfeiture standard 
should use at its base line the following three-pronged model test: 
 
60. See Forbes, supra note 40, at 241-42; see also Bator, supra note 41, at 304; 
Collin, supra note 40; Short, supra note 41. 
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A country forfeits its right to the return of its cultural property 
captured in war, when: 
1) such country has committed acts of substantial inhuman-
ity; 
2) such acts of inhumanity were supported by the general 
populace of such country; and 
3) such country’s cultural property was meaningfully used 
in, contributed to, or inspired such acts of inhumanity. 
2. Operation of the Cultural Forfeiture Test 
The primary purpose of this cultural forfeiture test is to deter-
mine when the international community should be concerned that 
the return of appropriated cultural art might contribute to a recrea-
tion of the dangerous cultural mindset which was in part responsi-
ble for the previous acts of inhumanity, and to otherwise justify 
cultural forfeiture on the basis of equitable concerns, even where 
such concern is not present.  Therefore, the first prong of the cul-
tural forfeiture test, that the country which has been deprived of 
cultural property has committed acts of substantial inhumanity, is 
intended to insure that where a country commits acts of inhuman-
ity, it earns deserved concern that its future behavior will conform 
to its past bad conduct.  Indeed, such concern was the basis for the 
Allies seizure, at the end of World War II, of works painted by the 
German military.  In fact, although Germany and German indi-
viduals have made requests that such paintings be returned, the 
United States, which holds many of those seized properties, has re-
fused.61  Forfeiture is justified by the serious concern over recidi-
vist national behavior by a country that has committed atrocities.  
Because cultural property—including artwork—helps shape a 
country’s character, it is one of the elements that underlie national 
conduct.62  Therefore, withholding a country’s cultural property 
 
61. See Morning Edition:  War Art Confiscated (National Public Radio broadcast, 
Aug. 4, 1997), transcript available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 12821475. 
62. See DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS:  ORDINARY 
GERMANS AND THE HOLOCAUST 7 (Vintage Books 1997) (1996) [hereinafter HITLER’S 
WILLING EXECUTIONERS].  Professor Goldhagen maintains that: 
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reduces prospects for new acts of inhumanity. 
Moreover, a country that has committed acts of inhumanity 
calls into question the very value of its cultural property, at least in 
relation to itself.  One of the underlying principles of the interna-
tional community’s call for the return of a country’s cultural prop-
erty is that the property is part of the essence of the country’s na-
tional character.63  If that is true, it follows that where a country’s 
character has been tarnished by recent acts of inhumanity, the cul-
tural value of its art is tarnished as well. 
The second prong of the cultural forfeiture test, that the de-
prived country’s acts of inhumanity were supported by the general 
populace, is intended to insure that such deprivation is equitable.  
In order to fairly deprive a country of its cultural property, the gen-
eral populace must be responsible for the country’s acts of inhu-
manity.64  A deprivation that affects the overall populace of a 
country is equitable where acts of inhumanity were committed by 
the overall populace.65 
 
The men and women who became the Holocaust’s perpetrators were shaped by 
and operated in a particular social and historical setting.  They brought with 
them prior elaborate conceptions of the world, ones that were common to their 
society, the investigation of which is necessary for explaining their actions.  
This entails, most fundamentally, a reexamination of the character and devel-
opment of anti-Semitism in Germany during its Nazi period and before, which 
in turn requires a theoretical reconsideration of the character of anti-Semitism 
itself. 
Id. at 7. 
63. See Forbes, supra note 40, at 241-42; see also Bator, supra note 41, at 304; 
Collin, supra note 40; Short, supra note 41. 
64. See Russell Glazer, Comment, The Sherman Amendment:  Congressional Rejec-
tion of Communal Liability for Civil Rights Violations, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1371 (1992) 
(discussing the notion of communal liability in Western philosophy). 
65. See id.  The Third Circuit’s reasoning is instructive in United States v. Kowal-
chuk, 773 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1985) (affirming denaturalization of an individual who con-
tributed to the persecution of Jews during World War II); see also Fedorenko v. United 
States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981) (denaturalizing defendants accused of contributing to Nazi 
persecution); Maikovskis v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 
1985) (same), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1182 (1986); United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115 
(2d Cir. 1985) (same); Laipenieks v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 750 F.2d 1427 
(9th Cir. 1985) (same); United States v. Kairys, 600 F. Supp. 1254 (N.D. Ill. 1984) 
(same), aff’d, 782 F.2d 1374 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986); United States 
v. Kungys, 571 F. Supp. 1104 (D.N.J. 1983) (same), rev’d, 793 F.2d 516 (3d Cir. 1986), 
rev’g circuit court and remanding, 485 U.S. 759 (1988); United States v. Schellong, 547 
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The third prong of the cultural forfeiture test, that the cultural 
property was meaningfully used in, contributed to, or inspired acts 
of inhumanity, is intended to insure a clear link between the lost 
cultural property and the country’s actions.  Through this link a 
country openly forfeits its right to its cultural property by tarnish-
ing the cultural property’s value and raising concern that returning 
the cultural property will inspire, or contribute to, future acts of in-
humanity. 
B. Cultural Forfeiture Serves Objectives of Punishment 
The cultural forfeiture standard also serves the four traditional 
objectives of punishment:  retribution, rehabilitation, deterrence, 
and incapacitation.66  Under a retributive vision of justice, punish-
ment is justified by the need to compensate society for the harm in-
flicted by the offender.67  The conceptual underpinnings of the re-
tributive model favor proportionality by striking a moral balance 
between the punishment inflicted and the gravity of the crime.68  
Since the recommended cultural forfeiture standard requires sub-
stantial acts of inhumanity done with popular support, cultural for-
feiture only punishes those deserving of punishment.  By depriving 
a country which has committed inhuman acts, and by allowing a 
country that was hurt by such deprived country to keep the prop-
 
F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (same), aff’d, 717 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 
465 U.S. 1007 (1984); United States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1982) (same), 
aff’d, 728 F.2d 1314 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984); United States v. Der-
cacz, 530 F. Supp. 1348 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (same); United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 
426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (same), aff’d, 685 F.2d 427 (2d Cir.) (mem.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
1036 (1982); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981) (same), 
aff’d, 680 F.2d 32 (6th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1036 (1982). 
66. See Toni M. Massaro, Shame, Culture, and American Criminal Law, 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 1880, 1890 (1991). 
67. See Brian J. Telpner, Note, Constructing Safe Communities:  Megan’s Laws and 
the Purposes of Punishment, 85 GEO. L.J. 2039, 2055 (1997). 
68. See Robert Blecker, Heaven or Hell? Inside Lorton Prison:  Experiences of 
Punishment Justified, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1164 (1990).  Immanuel Kant, the philoso-
phical forefather of retributivism, argued that punishment “can never be used merely as a 
means to promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but . . . 
must in all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime.”  
I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (J. Ladd trans. 1965).  Thus, pun-
ishment is conceived as an end in itself.  David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 
39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1627 (1992). 
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erty it has appropriated, a step towards compensating society for 
the harm inflicted by the offender is being made.  However, since 
the country that has been deprived has committed substantial acts 
of inhumanity, the severity of deprivation cannot by itself be 
nearly sufficient punishment to balance the gravity of the crime. 
Punishment also has been justified on the theory of rehabilita-
tion.  Through rehabilitation a criminal is taught attitudes, values, 
habits, and skills by which he can function productively and law-
fully.69  Rehabilitation can take constructive or destructive forms—
either helping offenders change their attitude and behavior or im-
posing negative stimuli to teach offenders to avoid wrongful be-
havior.70  Cultural forfeiture helps rehabilitate the criminal country 
by removing stimuli which contributed to the offense and simulta-
neously introducing a negative stimuli which teaches the offenders 
to avoid wrongful behavior. 
The goal of punishment under the deterrence model is to pre-
vent future crimes.71  Deterrence can take two forms:  “specific” or 
“general.”  Specific deterrence justifies punishment on the basis 
that the individual wrongdoer will be deterred from committing the 
same acts in the future.72  Specific deterrence bears some similarity 
to the rehabilitation rationale, in that both focus on the future be-
havior of the individual offender.73 
General deterrence, in contrast, seeks to justify punishment as 
deterring all members of society from committing the wrongful 
act.74  The philosophical underpinning of deterrence-based pun-
ishment is utilitarianism; these punishments, though imposing 
some “evil” in their own right, maximize the good for the greatest 
number by preventing greater evil in the future.75  A standard of 
cultural forfeiture serves the ends of both specific and general de-
terrence.  A country’s retention of appropriated artwork deters the 
deprived country from repeating its acts of inhumanity.  The ra-
 
69. See Massaro, supra note 66, at 1893-94. 
70. See Telpner, supra note 67, at 2058-59. 
71. See Massaro, supra note 66, at 1893-94. 
72. See id. at 1895. 
73. See Blecker, supra note 68, at 1197. 
74. See Telpner, supra note 67, at 2061. 
75. See id. at 2061. 
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tionale is that the deprived country realizes the gravity of the pun-
ishment:  that such acts, along with other punishments, will cause 
future appropriations of both the country’s new and remaining old 
cultural property.  Furthermore, taking such actions on the interna-
tional stage, along with other more severe forms of punishment, 
might deter other members of the international community from 
committing acts of inhumanity. 
The incapacitation justification for punishment argues that the 
key to punishment is disabling the offender from committing crime 
in the future.  Punishment should “protect the community from the 
offender, either by confining her physically, or otherwise disabling 
her from committing future crimes.”76  Incapacitation justifies im-
posing external controls on offenders to minimize future risk to so-
ciety.77  Since the cultural forfeiture standard requires that the cul-
tural property have been used in, or contributed to, the acts of 
inhumanity, depriving the actor of such cultural property may di-
minish the possibility of such repeated actions in the future. 
III. APPLICATION OF CULTURAL FORFEITURE TEST TO DISPUTE 
BETWEEN RUSSIA AND GERMANY 
During World War II, Germany perpetuated the greatest act of 
barbaric inhumanity in history.78  In a savage and brutal fashion 
Germans attempted to commit genocide, calling it the “final solu-
 
76. See Massaro, supra note 66, at 1899. 
77. See id. at 1899. 
78. See RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH, supra note 3, at 946 (summarizing the 
extent of the Nazi depravity during World War II).  In his landmark chronicle of the 
Third Reich, journalist and historian William L. Shirer characterized the Nazi era as an 
“incredible story of horror [that] would be unbelievable were it not fully documented and 
testified to by the perpetrators themselves:” 
Nazi degradation sank to a level seldom experienced by man in all his time on 
earth.  Millions of decent, innocent men and women were driven into forced la-
bor, millions more tortured and tormented in the concentration camps and mil-
lions more still, of whom there were four and a half million Jews alone, were 
massacred in cold blood or deliberately starved to death and their remains—in 
order to remove the traces—burned. 
Id. at 946; see also NORMAN DAVIES, EUROPE:  A HISTORY 897 (Oxford Univ. Press 1996) 
(“There are shades of barbarism in twentieth-century Europe which would once have 
amazed the most barbarous of barbarians.”). 
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tion” to the “Jewish question.”79  The mass murders committed by 
Germany certainly constituted substantial acts of inhumanity, were 
popularly supported, and incorporated Germany’s cultural prop-
erty.80  Therefore, Germany’s actions justify, inter alia, Russia’s 
retaining Germany’s cultural property as cultural forfeiture. 
A. Germany’s Substantial Acts of Inhumanity 
Between 1933 and 1945, Germany undertook a state-
sponsored, systematic persecution and annihilation of European 
Jewry.81  More than six million Jews were murdered.82  Gypsies 
and the handicapped were also targeted for destruction.83  “Mil-
lions more, including homosexuals, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Soviet 
prisoners of war, and political dissidents, also suffered grievous 
oppression and were put to death under Nazi tyranny.”84 
 
79. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO WORLD WAR II 364-71 (I.C.B Dear & M.R.D. 
Foot, eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) [hereinafter OXFORD WORLD WAR II COMPANION] 
(summarizing the Endlösung, “final solution:” the term used by the Germans for the ex-
termination of six million Jews during World War II).  Reichsmarschall Hermann Goer-
ing used the phrase “final solution” in 1941, when he directed Nazi state security chief 
Reinhard Heydrich to report as soon as possible on the “measures already taken for the 
intended final solution of the Jewish question.”  Goering Directive to Heydrich, (July 31, 
1941), quoted in RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH, supra note 3, at 964 (citing III NAZI 
CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION 525-26 (Nuremberg Document No. 710-PS)).  The phrase 
“final solution” was subsequently used in an official letter written by Adolf Eichmann, 
the SS officer who, in autumn 1941, “was entrusted with the task of preparing the me-
chanics of the final solution.”  OXFORD WORLD WAR II COMPANION, supra, at 368.  
Eichmann wrote that a Jewish woman’s emigration application had been denied “in view 
of the approaching final solution of the European Jewry problem.”  Letter from Adolf 
Eichmann to the German Foreign Office (Oct. 28, 1941), quoted in OXFORD WORLD WAR 
II COMPANION, supra, at 368.  The phrase “final solution” subsequently appeared in many 
official German documents.  Id. 
80. See RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH, supra note 3, at 241-44 (detailing the 
“Nazification” of German culture between 1933 and 1937, the period in which the Nazis 
consolidated their hold over German life) 
81. See UNITED STATES HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM, THE HOLOCAUST:  A 
HISTORICAL SUMMARY 1 (n.d.) [hereinafter HOLOCAUST SUMMARY]; see also SUSAN D. 
BACHRACH, TELL THEM WE REMEMBER:  THE STORY OF THE HOLOCAUST passim (1994) 
[hereinafter WE REMEMBER]. 
82. See HOLOCAUST SUMMARY, supra note 81, at 1.  See RISE AND FALL OF THE 
THIRD REICH, supra note 3, at 967-74, for a chilling account of the operation of the ex-
termination camps. 
83. See HOLOCAUST SUMMARY, supra note 81, at 1. 
84. Id. 
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Germany set its course toward cultural depravity in 1933, when 
Adolph Hitler became Chancellor of Germany.85  That same year 
the German government took away the freedom of speech, assem-
bly, and press, and opened the first concentration camp at Dachau, 
Germany, for political opponents of the regime.86  Later in 1933, a 
nationwide boycott of Jewish-owned businesses in Germany was 
carried out; laws were passed to permit forced sterilization of Gyp-
sies, the mentally and physically disabled, African-Germans, and 
others considered “inferior” or “unfit;” other laws excluded “non-
Aryans” from government employment.87  The following year, 
homosexuals and Jehovah’s Witnesses were arrested throughout 
Germany.88  In 1935, racial laws were introduced at a rally in Nur-
emberg,89 after which Gypsies were arrested and deported to Da-
chau concentration camp.90  In 1938, the Germans burned numer-
 
85. See HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 62, at 87-94 (summarizing 
the anti-Semitic German consensus that existed upon Hitler’s assumption of national 
power in 1933).  That consensus was based on a belief that “[t]he Jews and Slavic peo-
ples were the Untermenschen—subhumans . . . [who] had no right to live.”  RISE AND 
FALL OF THE THIRD REICH, supra note 3, at 937; see also MEIN KAMPF 51-65, supra note 
3 (detailing Hitler’s transformation into an anti-Semite).  Hitler wrote that: 
 If, with the help of his Marxist creed, the Jew is victorious over the other 
peoples of the world, his crown will be the funeral wreath of humanity and this 
planet will, as it did thousands of years ago, move through the ether devoid of 
men. 
 Eternal Nature inexorably avenges the infringement of her commands. 
 Hence today I believe that I am acting in accordance of the will of the Al-
mighty Creator:  by defending myself against the Jew, I am fighting for the 
work of the Lord. 
Id. at 65. 
86. See RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH, supra note 3, at 271 (“From the very 
first weeks of 1933, when the massive and arbitrary arrests, beatings and murders by 
those in power began, Germany under National Socialism ceased to be a society based on 
law.”); see also HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 62, at 89-93 (summarizing 
the severance of Jews from the German bodies social and politic and the beginning of 
their treatment as aliens within Germany). 
87. See, e.g., RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH, supra note 3, at 268 (detailing the 
passage of Germany’s Civil Service law of April 7, 1933, which “quickly rid the [Ger-
man] judiciary not only of Jews but those whose Nazism was deemed questionable”). 
88. See generally id. at 231-276 (summarizing life in Nazi Germany between 1933 
and 1937, including the crackdown on non-Aryans). 
89. See id. at 233-34 (detailing the effects of the Nuremberg Laws of September 15, 
1935). 
90. See id. at 271 (“The first concentration camps sprang up like mushrooms during 
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ous synagogues and looted Jewish homes in a nationwide program 
called Kristallnacht, and nearly thirty thousand Jewish men were 
deported to concentration camps.91 
On September 1, 1939, Germany’s invasion of Poland began 
the conflict that escalated into World War II.92  The following 
month German doctors were authorized to kill institutionalized 
mentally and physically disabled persons in an “euthanasia” pro-
gram.93  In the spring of 1940, Germany invaded Denmark, Nor-
way, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and France,94 and in 
1941, Germany invaded North Africa, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the 
Soviet Union.95 During this time Germany established mobile kill-
ing squads, Einsatzgruppen, to begin the mass murder of Jews, 
Gypsies, and Communist leaders.96  In one incident alone, in the 
forests of Babi Yar, nearly thirty-four thousand Jews were killed.97  
In December 1941, gassing operations began at the Chelmno ex-
termination camp.98 
In 1942, German leaders met to discuss the “final solution to 
the Jewish question.”99  Later that year, Germany began the mass 
 
Hitler’s first year of power.  By the end of 1933, there were fifty of them.”). 
91. See EUROPE:  A HISTORY, supra note 78, at 976. 
92. See MARTIN GILBERT, THE SECOND WORLD WAR:  A COMPLETE HISTORY 1 (rev. 
ed. 1991) [hereinafter GILBERT, SECOND WORLD WAR HISTORY] (reporting that the attack 
on Poland in September 1939 triggered one of “the most destructive conflicts in human 
history; more than forty-six million soldiers and civilians perished, many in circum-
stances of prolonged and horrifying cruelty”); see also JOHN KEEGAN, THE SECOND 
WORLD WAR 44-47 (1990) [hereinafter KEEGAN, SECOND WORLD WAR] (summarizing 
the invasion of Poland and the strategy behind the attack). 
93. See WE REMEMBER, supra note 81, at 32. 
94. See KEEGAN, SECOND WORLD WAR, supra note 92, at 54-87; GILBERT, SECOND 
WORLD WAR HISTORY, supra note 92, at 52-56, 61-116. 
95. See KEEGAN, SECOND WORLD WAR, supra note 92, at 127-59, 173-208; 
GILBERT, SECOND WORLD WAR HISTORY, supra note 92, 165-211. 
96. See WE REMEMBER, supra note 81, at 42 (describing the Einsatzgruppen as 
“[s]pecial action squads . . . made up of Nazi (SS) units and police”). 
97. See id. at 42-43. 
98. See id. at 48. 
99. Id. at 46.  The conference was held on January 20, 1942, at a villa in the Berlin 
suburb of Wansee to coordinate the activities of German government agencies in devel-
oping Zyklon-B gas, crematoria, and dedicated death camps for the “final solution.”  See 
EUROPE:  A HISTORY, supra note 78, at 1016-18.  The Wansee Conference was convened 
by Gestapo chief and SS Obergruppenführer, “lieutenant-general,” Reinhard Heydrich, 
the head of the Reich Security Main Office (“RHSA”), who indicated to the conference 
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murder of Jews in the gas chambers at six extermination camps:  
Chelmno, Auschwitz-Birkenau, Treblinka, Sobibór, Belzec, and 
Majdanek-Lublin.100  In 1943, Germany put down Jewish armed 
resistance in the Warsaw Ghetto, and the Treblinka and Sobibór 
concentration camps.101  In 1944, Germany occupied Hungary and 
deported 430,000 Hungarian Jews to Auschwitz-Birkenau, where 
most of them were gassed.102  On June 6, 1944, D-Day, the Allied 
powers invaded Western Europe.  Less than one year later, on May 
7, 1945, Germany surrendered ending the war in Europe.103 
B. Germany’s Acts of Inhumanity Were Popularly Supported 
The Holocaust was the defining feature of German politics and 
political culture during World War II.104  Although members of 
other national groups helped the Germans murder millions of Jews, 
“the commission of the Holocaust was primarily a German under-
taking.”105  Germany was the driving force behind the Holocaust 
 
that “in the course of this Final Solution of the European Jewish problem approximately 
eleven million Jews are involved”—to be worked to death or killed outright.  XIII TRIALS 
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 210-19 (Nuremberg 
Document No. NG-2586-G), quoted in RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH, supra note 3, 
at 965-66. 
100. See WE REMEMBER, supra note 81, at 48. 
101. See id. at 70-72. 
102. See id. at 48. 
103. See id. at 91-92.  See generally Lawrence Douglas, Film as Witness:  Screen-
ing Nazi Concentration Camps Before the Nuremberg Tribunal, 105 YALE L.J. 449 
(1995) (discussing German activity during World War II within a legal context); Law-
rence Douglas, Wartime Lies:  Securing the Holocaust in Law and Literature, 7 YALE 
J.L. & HUMAN 367 (1995) (same); K. Lesli Ligorner, Note, Nazi Concentration Camp 
Guard Service Equals “Good Moral Character”?:  United Sates v. Lindert, 12 AM. U. J. 
INT’L L. & POL’Y 145 (1997) (same); Matthew Lippman, Fifty Years After Auschwitz:  
Prosecutions of Nazi Death Camp Defendants, 11 CONN. J. INT’L L. 199 (1996) (same); 
Vera Ranki, Holocaust History and the Law:  Recent Trials Emerging Theories, 9 
CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 15 (1997) (same); Kirsten E. Swisher, Note, Justice 
Delayed:  The Role of Equitable Considerations in the Denaturalization and Deportation 
of Nazi War Collaborators, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 415 (1993) (same); Geri J. Yonover, 
Anti-Semitism and Holocaust Denial in the Academy:  A Tort Remedy, 101 DICK. L. REV. 
71 (1996) (same); Compensation for Property Confiscated by Nazis is Exempt From U.S. 
Tax, 83 J. TAX’N 154 (1995) (same). 
104. See HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 62, at 4-5 (“Explaining the 
Holocaust is the central intellectual problem for understanding Germany during the Nazi 
period.”). 
105. See id. at 6 (explaining that the Germans were the most culpable for the atroci-
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because “the decisions, plans, organizational resources and the ma-
jority of its executors were German.”106  Professor Daniel J. Gold-
hagen notes that “the first task in restoring the perpetrators to the 
center of our understanding of the Holocaust” is to grammatically 
restore the perpetrators to their identities by “eschewing conven-
ient, yet often inappropriate and obfuscating labels, like ‘Nazis’ 
and ‘SS men,’ and calling them what they are, ‘Germans.’  The 
most appropriate, indeed the only appropriate general proper name 
for Germans who perpetrated the Holocaust is ‘Germans.’”107 
Hundreds of thousands of Germans had a role in the slaughter 
of the Jews and the “vast concentration camp system.”108  Al-
though the Nazi state made “half-hearted attempts” to minimize 
exposure of the German populace to the killings, millions knew of 
the genocide.109  When the Germans who exploited slave labor are 
counted among those involved in the genocide, millions of German 
people perpetrated grievous crimes and atrocities during World 
War II.110 
Although Germany is known to have operated 10,005 camps 
and ghettos during World War II,111 it is likely that more camps 
 
ties that were committed because “[n]on-Germans were not essential to the perpetration 
of the genocide, and they did not supply the drive and initiative that pushed it forward”). 
106. See id. at 6. 
107. Id. at 6. 
108. See id. at 8 (reporting that anti-Semitic sentiment was so prevalent during the 
Nazi reign that it touched almost all segments of the German populace). 
109. See id. at 8 (detailing the widespread knowledge of the Holocaust in Ger-
many).  Professor Goldhagen states: 
Hitler announced many times, emphatically, that the war would end in the ex-
termination of the Jews.  The killings met with general understanding, if not 
approval.  No other policy (of similar or greater scope) was carried out with 
more persistence and zeal, and with fewer difficulties, than the genocide, ex-
cept perhaps the war itself. 
Id. at 8 (footnote omitted). 
110. See id. at 166-67 (hypothesizing that “[i]t would not be surprising if the num-
ber [of perpetrators of the Holocaust] turned out to be five hundred thousand or more”); 
see also KONNILYN G. FEIG, HITLER’S DEATH CAMPS:  THE SANITY OF MADNESS 12-13 
(1981) [hereinafter HITLER’S DEATH CAMPS]. 
111. See HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 62, at 167 (stating that a 
study revealed the existence of more than 10,000 camps if ghettos are considered); see 
also HITLER’S DEATH CAMPS, supra note 110, at 26. 
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existed and have not been identified.112  Of the 10,005 known 
forced labor camps and ghettos, Jews were murdered in more than 
1,600 of them.113  In addition, Germany operated “52 main concen-
tration camps which had a total of 1,202 satellite camps.”114  It is 
not certain how many Germans worked at those camps and ghet-
tos, but it is known, for example, that Auschwitz had 7,000 guards 
at various times in its main camp and 50 satellites, Dachau had 
4,100 guards and administrators, and Mauthusen had over 5,700 
guards and administrators.115 
The Einsatzgruppen, one of the itinerant German killing insti-
tutions, started out with 3,000 men; replacements were rotated in 
and out,116 and the unit catalogue for the Einsatzgruppen lists more 
than 6,000 persons.117  In addition, thirty-eight police battalions 
“participated in the genocidal slaughter of European Jews;” a 
minimum of 19,000 men served in those police battalions, and it is 
probable that even more served “because [those battalions] had 
personnel rotations.”118  Between 1941 and 1943, three SS119 bri-
gades also slaughtered Jews in the Soviet Union.120  The total 
number of persons who served in the various killing institutions 
exceeds 330,000, according to the entries in one catalogue.121  Ad-
ditionally, unknown thousands of Germans directly contributed to 
the genocide in their roles as administrators, railroad officials, 
army soldiers, police and other deportation personnel, and slave 
 
112. See HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 62, at 167. 
113. See id. at 167. 
114. Id. at 167. 
115. See id. at 167 (stating that “[o]ne estimate concludes that fifty guards were 
necessary for every five hundred prisoners in a satellite camp”). 
116. See id. at 167; see also HITLER’S DEATH CAMPS, supra note 110, at 20-22. 
117. See HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 62, at 167. 
118. Id. at 167.  Police battalions averaged more than five hundred men and played 
a significant role in the slaughter of the Jews.  See id. at 181-82. 
119. SS was the abbreviation for Schutzstaffeln, “protection squads,” established 
within the Nazi Party as a military organization that swore personal allegiance to Hitler.  
See OXFORD WORLD WAR II COMPANION, supra note 79, at 1044-50. 
120. See HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 62, at 167. 
121. See id. at 168 (stating that the catalogue “has information on 4,105 institutions 
involved or suspected of having been involved in Nazi crimes”); see also NAZI MASS 
MURDER:  A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE USE OF POISON GAS 
[NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE MASSENTÖTUNGEN DURCH GIFTGAS] (Eugen Kogon et al. eds., 
Mary Scott & Caroline Lloyd-Morris trans., Yale Univ. Press 1993). 
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labor supervisors.122  Those Germans shared moral responsibility 
for the Holocaust, even if they did not participate directly in the 
killings. 
Moral philosophers have focused on contexts in which indi-
viduals may seek to deflect blame onto the organizations to which 
they belong by arguing that the organization is to blame, that they 
were only doing their job, or that their contributions were too 
minimal to justify holding them morally responsible.123 Philoso-
phers have argued that in order to evaluate properly an individual’s 
acts, it is necessary to consider how those acts might foreseeably 
combine with the acts of others to produce significant effects.124 
The harm the Nazis wrought was accomplished by an organ-
ized effort that integrated the actions of many individuals who oc-
cupied different roles in many different organizations.125  Because 
killing large amounts of people can only be accomplished through 
an organized group effort, moral responsibility will attach to an in-
dividual member merely because the individual voluntarily joined 
and retained membership in a group while knowing the group’s ob-
jectives.126 
Where the contribution of any particular group member to a 
collective action is neither necessary nor sufficient, each member 
may seek to deny moral responsibility.127  To deal with this prob-
lem, each person involved in a collective action must be held mor-
ally responsible even though his actions were neither causally nec-
 
122. See HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 62, at 167. 
123. See Stephen J. Massey, Individual Responsibility for Assisting the Nazis in 
Persecuting Civilians, 71 MINN. L. REV. 97, 99 (1986). 
124. See 1 RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 8-13 (rev. ed. 
1985) [hereinafter DESTRUCTION OF JEWS]; see also Massey, supra note 123, at 99. 
125. See DESTRUCTION OF JEWS, supra note 124, at 9.  Hilberg wrote that: 
The destruction of the Jews was an administrative process, and the annihilation 
of Jewry required the implementation of systematic administrative measures in 
successive steps.  There are not many ways in which a modern society can, in 
short order, kill a large number of people living in its midst.  This is an effi-
ciency problem of the greatest dimensions, one which poses uncounted difficul-
ties and innumerable obstacles. 
Id. at 9; see Massey, supra note 123, at 136. 
126. See Massey, supra note 123, at 140; see also DESTRUCTION OF JEWS, supra 
note 124, at 9. 
127. See Massey, supra note 123, at 140. 
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essary nor sufficient.128  When an individual knows that his ac-
tions, in combination with the actions of others, will produce harm, 
he has a moral obligation not to act, even when his actions in isola-
tion would have an insignificant effect.129  Therefore, the German 
populace, with millions who had a direct hand in the murders and 
many more whose actions supported such murders, was responsi-
ble for the Holocaust.  Thus, the German populace’s involvement 
in the Holocaust is “staggering.”130 
C. Germany’s Cultural Property was Meaningfully Used in, 
Contributed to, and Inspired Acts of Inhumanity 
Germany’s cultural property was substantially used in, and 
stimulated the commission of barbaric acts.  Although art generally 
is thought to have a humanizing effect, “to the Nazis, art was a rea-
son for their atrocities.”131  On the eve of the Holocaust, the Ger-
man people were extremely culturally sophisticated.  German na-
tional art was representative of both the common people and the 
intellectuals.  The art valued by Germans was reflective of their 
psyches at that time.  It was that collective cultural psyche that led 
Germans to commit acts of inhumanity and allowed them to pro-
ceed so efficiently in their barbarism.  Because German national 
art is a reflection of an inhumane psyche, and because it contrib-
uted to the Germans’ ability to commit acts of inhumanity, the 
Germans substantially deflated the value of such art to German so-
ciety and Germany’s right to the return of the artwork. 
German cultural works were used to incite German acts of in-
 
128. See id. at 140. 
129. See id. at 142; see also DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 67-86 (1984). 
130. Professor Goldhagen posits that: 
When the number of people who were parties to the genocidal enterprise, who 
must have staffed these institutions and occupied these roles, is considered, and 
when the still far larger number who worked in the larger system of domina-
tion . . . is also taken into account, the inescapable conclusion is that the num-
ber of Germans who contributed to and, more broadly, had knowledge of this 
regime’s fundamental criminality was staggering. 
HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 62, at 168. 
131. John Dorsey, The Nazis and the Art of Theft; History:  Loyola College Profes-
sor Explores the Blurred Line Between Art and Politics in the Eyes of the Third Reich, 
BALT. SUN, May 1, 1996, at E1. 
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humanity and were believed by the Germans to be a reflection of 
their persona.  For example, in his pseudo-autobiographical novel 
of 1923, Michael, Joseph Goebbels, who would later be in charge 
of Nazi propaganda, wrote that art was one of the essential compo-
nents in building a new German utopia.132  The arts thrived in war-
time Germany because of immense encouragement by the govern-
ment.133  Even when all other able-bodied Germans were recruited 
into the military, the best artists and musicians were exempt.134  
The Nazis even revised copyright laws in order to give creators 
greater protection.135  According to one noted scholar, Professor 
Steinweis, the Berlin Philharmonic and other artistic organizations 
and institutions legitimized the Nazi-German regime by maintain-
ing the image of Germany as the land of Goethe and Beethoven.136 
In 1939, Hitler had his office in the Reich Chancellery very 
carefully decorated.137  He chose works which reflected the Ger-
man cultural persona and which glorified himself, the German 
people, and the German philosophies incorporated in Nazi ideol-
ogy.  There were representations of Frederick the Great and Bis-
marck to imply that Hitler was the heir to a distinguished line-
age.138  Angelica Kauffmann’s painting, “Hermann’s Return from 
the Battle of the Teutoburger Forest,” recorded a German victory 
over the Romans, and represented Hitler’s promise of future Ger-
 
132. Adolph Hitler’s propaganda chief Joseph Goebbels wrote that: 
Europe will be reconstructed by peoples who will be the first to overcome the 
mass madness and find their way back to the principles of personality . . . .  
Works of art, inventions, ideas, battles, laws and states—at the beginning of all 
of them stands always the man. 
JOSEPH GOEBBELS, MICHAEL (1923), quoted in Alan Steinweis, Hitler and Carlyle’s 
“Historical Greatness”, HISTORY TODAY, June 1, 1995, at 33. 
133. See David Patrick Stearns, Between the Lines, OPERA NEWS, July 1, 1995, at 
26. 
134. See id. 
135. See id. 
136. See id.; ALAN E. STEINWEIS, ART, IDEOLOGY, & ECONOMICS IN NAZI GERMANY:  
THE REICH CHAMBERS OF MUSIC, THEATER AND THE VISUAL ARTS (Univ. of North Caro-
lina Press 1993) [hereinafter NAZI ART, IDEOLOGY & ECONOMICS] (asserting that artists 
“bestowed a certain cultural legitimacy” on the Nazi movement).  Steinweis is an associ-
ate professor of History and Judaic studies at the University of Nebraska. 
137. See Dorsey, supra note 131. 
138. See id. 
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man military triumph.139  The school of Rubens’ painting in Hit-
ler’s office, “Hercules and Omphale,” evoked both the classical, 
glorious times which the German people hoped Hitler would bring 
again, and the image of a hero, which is how the German people 
envisioned Hitler.140  Indeed, paintings of Hitler, particularly in 
medieval armor,141 were popular throughout Germany.142 
Potent art can generate ideas and influence individual attitudes.  
The Nazis took culture seriously and sought to bend it to their 
will.143  The Nazis’ determination to control German culture pro-
duced an extremely elaborate system of state subsidy.144  As much 
energy and money was spent on the arts as on the autobahns.145  
Enormous sums were lavished on orchestras, museums, and thea-
ters, and generous prizes were awarded to favored writers, com-
posers, and artists.146  Culture influenced the way the Nazi state 
saw itself, and Hitler frequently gave speeches on artistic topics.147  
The Nazi dedication to culture actively shaped the Nazi attitude 
and facilitated acts of inhumanity.148 
According to one commentator, Diane du Bois,149 “the Nazis 
used art to serve their own propaganda ends.”150  Likewise, accord-
 
139. See id. 
140. See id. 
141. SEE EUROPE:  A HISTORY, supra note 78, at 942-43, Plate No. 58 (photographic 
depiction of H. Lanzinger’s Adolf Hitler als Ritter (c.1939), a portrait of Adolf Hitler in 
armor as a Teutonic knight). 
142. See Morning Edition:  War Art Confiscated (National Public Radio broadcast, 
Aug. 4, 1997), transcript available in WESTLAW, 1997 WL 12821475. 
143. See Frank Whitford, Rot of the Reich, THE TIMES (London), Sept. 7, 1997, 
(Culture), at 29. 
144. See id. 
145. See id. 
146. See id.  Some artists, such as the sculptor Arno Breker, were freed from the 
obligation to pay income tax.  See id. 
147. See id. 
148. See id. 
149. Executive director of the musical collection, Music Nearly Lost—Europe Be-
tween the Wars—A Celebration, Sarasota Music Archive.  See Kurt Loft, Music From the 
Silence:  Jewish and Avant-Garde Composers Condemned by Hitler’s Regime are Re-
ceiving New Recognition Thanks to a Remarkable Series of Recordings and a Musical 
Archive in Sarasota, TAMPA TRIB., Dec. 28, 1997, (Baylife) at 1. 
150. See id. (quoting Diane du Bois). 
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ing to Professor Jonathan Petropoulos,151 Germans used art for its 
symbolic meaning in order to further the Nazi cause.152  Professor 
Petropoulos writes that, for the Nazis, “[a]rt offered a means to 
achieve legitimacy and social recognition.”153  In addition, art 
played a significant role in Germany’s quest for world domina-
tion.154 
Adolf Hitler had more than six thousand paintings in his per-
sonal collection.155  Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering, Hitler’s 
second in command, bought old masters such as Rembrandt and 
Van Dyck,156 and his collection included paintings by the old mas-
ters, looted from the Louvre Museum in Paris.157  Heinrich 
Himmler, head of the SS, had an affinity for classic art related to 
war, and his collection included a Etruscan bronze helmet, medie-
val armor, and old ceremonial spears.158  The Minister of Culture 
in Nazi Germany would arrange exhibits contrasting “worthless” 
works by “sub-humans” with compositions depicting the Aryan 
man in settings highlighting his superior qualities.159 
In the aggregate, Germans viewed the acquisition of art as le-
gitimizing the Nazi regime and its actions.160  The Nazis used cul-
ture to “cover the stench of barbarism” with the “essence of high 
art.”161  As a result, Professor Petropoulos contends that “the Nazis 
preoccupation with culture was so great that it became an element 
 
151. Professor of History at Loyola College. 
152. See JONATHAN PETROPOULOS, ART AS POLITICS IN THE THIRD REICH 7, 14 
(1996). 
153. See id. at 7. 
154. See Dorsey, supra note 131. 
155. See ART AS POLITICS IN THE THIRD REICH, supra note 152, at 181. 
156. See id. at 187-88. 
157. See supra note 3 (setting forth Goering’s secret order for the disposition of art 
masterpieces stolen from France, dividing the loot among himself, Hitler, and German 
national collections). 
158. See ART AS POLITICS IN THE THIRD REICH, supra note 152, at 212-14. 
159. Paul Bogdanich, The Acceptable Alternative, SALT LAKE TRIB., Nov. 17, 1997, 
at A8. 
160. See ART AS POLITICS IN THE THIRD REICH, supra note 152, at 261, 310-11. 
161. Justin Davidson, Villains or Heroes?  Was Wilhelm Furtwangler a pawn of the 
Nazis or a guardian of the German cultural tradition?  What about Elisabeth Schwarz-
kopf and Herbert von Karajan?, NEWSDAY, Oct. 13, 1996, at C17 (reviewing Ronald 
Horwood’s 1986 play, Taking Sides, at the Brooks Atkinson Theater on Broadway). 
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in itself in the motivation behind their behavior.”162 
Another prime example of German culture used to inspire the 
Germans’ inhumane acts is German architecture.  The scale, mate-
rials, and iconography of prestige projects in Berlin, for instance, 
were used by the Nazis to promote an ideological connection to 
classical political and social institutions.163  Nazi party and German 
state institutions used architecture to reinforce a connection to ra-
cial history or to the supposed essence of Germanness.164  Indeed, 
in any investigation of National Socialist culture, art, and politics 
are complementary terms.165  As art scholar Paul Jaskot notes, the 
pseudo-scientific Nazi racial theories and propaganda that contrib-
uted to the efforts to destroy the Jewish people were buttressed by 
art or architectural production and contemporaneous critical re-
sponse.166 Furthermore, Professor Jaskot hypothesized that German 
culture combined with Nazi policies contributed to the destruction 
of the Jewish population.167 
An additional example of the German use of cultural works in 
the perpetration of the Holocaust, and as inspiration for the Holo-
caust, is the work of the composer Richard Wagner.168  Wagner’s 
music was played at Nazi rallies and at Nazi state occasions to 
raise the passions of the German people;169 concentration camp 
 
162. ART AS POLITICS IN THE THIRD REICH, supra note 152, at 261. 
163. See Paul B. Jaskot, Anti-Semitic Policy in Albert Speer’s Plans for the Rebuild-
ing of Berlin, 78 ART BULLETIN 622 (1996).  Jaskot is an assistant professor in the De-
partment of Art at DePaul University.  See also NAZI ART, IDEOLOGY & ECONOMICS, su-
pra note 136, at 34-38. 
164. See NAZI ART, IDEOLOGY & ECONOMICS, supra note 136, at 34-38; Jaskot, su-
pra note 163. 
165. See Jaskot, supra note 163. 
166. See id. 
167. Professor Jaskot opined that: 
The symbiosis between that which was most prized in Nazi Germany—its cul-
ture—and that which proved most criminal—its policies aimed at eliminating 
specific social and political groups—indicates the extent to which architectural 
interests were involved with events that culminated in the destruction of the 
Jewish population in Berlin. 
Id. 
168. Richard Wagner, the German opera composer, coined the term “the plastic 
demon of the decay of humanity” to describe Jews.  HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, 
supra note 62, at 398. 
169. Note also the work of Wagner’s protege, German composer Richard Strauss, 
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victims were forced to play German music, including Wagner’s, 
when the doomed marched to the gas chambers and while torture 
took place,170 and Wagner’s anti-Semitic writings, such as “Jews in 
Music,” further fomented the German anti-Semitism that fostered 
the Holocaust.171  While Wagner’s work is perhaps one of the 
strongest examples of the role of Germany’s cultural works in the 
Holocaust, all of Germany’s cultural property is tainted by its rela-
tion to Germany’s actions.  Consequently, all Germany’s cultural 
property can be said to have contributed to Germany’s inhuman 
acts because the Holocaust was the product of Germany’s social 
and cultural frame of mind.172  The society and culture of Germany 
was permeated with anti-Semitism.173  Professor Goldhagen stated 
that “understanding the beliefs and values common to German cul-
ture . . . is the most essential task for explaining the perpetration of 
the holocaust.”174  Furthermore, a nation’s artistic heritage reflects 
its cultural ideology.175  The cultural anti-Semitism of Germany’s 
common people and cultural elite evidences the taint of Germany’s 
cultural property.176  Anti-Semitism was prevalent in Germany 
from artist cliques to universities.177  It corrupted lawyers and 
 
who became the president of the Reich Music Chamber during World War Two.  See 
Emanuel Krasovsky, Classical Music; Music Once Banned, Now Business as Usual, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 18, 1998, § 2, at 30. 
170. See Dimitri Drobatschewsky, Ross’s Swan Song:  Controversial “Ring”, 
GREATER PHOENIX JEWISH NEWS, Sept. 12, 1997, at 14 (reporting that the Arizona Op-
era’s annual Wagner festival was controversial in the Jewish community because mem-
bers of the community connected Wagner with Adolf Hitler and the Holocaust). 
171. See id. 
172. See HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 62, at 7 (“The men and 
women who became the Holocaust’s perpetrators were shaped by and operated in a par-
ticular social and historical setting.  They brought with them prior elaborate conceptions 
of the world, ones that were common to their society, the investigation of which is neces-
sary for explaining their actions.”) 
173. See id. at 8, 80-128.  German literature also was permeated with anti-Semitism, 
and blamed the Jews “for nearly every evil that had befallen the world.”  Id. at 28, 64. 
174. Id. at 23. 
175. See Elliott, supra note 18, at 279. 
176. See EUROPE:  A HISTORY, supra note 78, at 899 (noting that the material ad-
vancement of European civilization was accompanied by a “terrible regression in politi-
cal and intellectual values,” in which “Europe’s most educated elites” joined “the ma-
nipulated masses of the most afflicted nations” in participating in the “genocidal crusade 
for rescuing ‘European civilization’”). 
177. See HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS, supra note 62, at 83 (summarizing the 
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judges and perverted doctors.178  Because cultural works contrib-
uted to Germany’s cultural frame of mind, reflected that cultural 
frame of mind, and helped perpetrate German acts of inhumanity, 
Germany greatly diminished the value of its cultural property—
raising concern that Germany might again use the art seized by 
Russia to foster atrocity.  Consequently, Germany has forfeited its 
right to that cultural property. 
CONCLUSION 
The artwork in Russia’s possession taken by Germany from 
Germany’s victims must be returned to such victims or their survi-
vors, regardless of what happens to the other works in Russia’s 
possession.  Those pieces are not German cultural property, but 
rather stolen property.  Russia has stated that it is committed to re-
turning such artwork to its true owners.  Germany, which is re-
sponsible for the persecution of art collectors, among others, and 
the subsequent theft of their art, should be equally committed to 
making restitution. 
As for the artwork taken from German national institutions, 
whether or not the international treaties are found to apply either as 
determinative or indicative, and regardless of the legality of Rus-
sia’s taking the artwork, Russia should be allowed to keep the ap-
propriated German cultural property.  Germany’s acts of cultural 
depravity justify its cultural deprivation. 
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The concept of cultural forfeiture should be introduced to the 
international arena and this Essay’s cultural forfeiture test—or a 
similar test—should be created.  The test should create an excep-
tion to the UNIDROIT Convention.  Under this Essay’s model cul-
tural forfeiture test, Germany forfeited its right to its cultural prop-
erty by the commission of popularly supported acts of inhumanity, 
which incorporated and were inspired by its cultural property.  
Such forfeiture would serve the objectives of punishment and 
would hopefully diminish the future occurrence of acts of atrocity. 
